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Whether the district court properly dismissed all of Appellants Craig and Serena Watson
(the "Watsons") claims against all Defendants-Respondents for failure to state a claim pursuant
to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF CASE
The Watsons brought this lawsuit in an attempt to prevent non-judicial foreclosure of

their home.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A.

Allegations Of The Amended Complaint

The Watsons filed their complaint on August 7, 2014 in the Kootenai County District
Court. (Clerk's Record on Appeal ("R. ") R.16). The Watsons filed an amended complaint (the
"Amended Complaint") on August 25, 2014. (R.49). At the time the Amended Complaint was
filed, the Watsons were represented by Henry D. Madsen of Madsen Law Offices, P.C. (See
R.56).
The Amended Complaint named Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank of America")
Greenpoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("Greenpoint"), ReconTrust Company, N.A. ("Recontrust"),
Green Tree Servicing LLC ("Green Tree") 1, Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie

1

As a result of a merger that occurred after this lawsuit was filed, Green Tree Servicing LLC is
now known as Di tech Financial LLC. To avoid confusion, this brief will use the term "Green
Tree."
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Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), Mortgage Funding Inc.,
North Idaho Title, and Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. as defendants.
The Amended Complaint alleges that the Watsons purchased a home in Coeur d'Alene,
Idaho with a loan from Greenpoint that was memorialized in an executed note ("Note") and deed
of trust ("Deed of Trust"). (See R.51 at ,1,114-15; R.52 at ,119). In May 2010, the Watsons
applied for and received a loan modification from Bank of America ("Loan Modification
Agreement"). (R.52-53 at ,1,123-30). The Watsons signed the Loan Modification Agreement and
returned it to Bank of America. (R.52 at i!25).
The Watsons allege in the Amended Complaint that, at some unspecified point in time,
they requested a copy of the Loan Modification Agreement with the signature of the "Lender,"
but do not specify which entity they believe should have signed the Loan Modification
Agreement. (R.52-53 at i!i!28-29). The Watsons claim that they "began receiving statements
from [Bank of America] but said statements did not credit them for the payments they were
making." (R.53 at i!30). Over three years after the Loan Modification Agreement, a "Notice of
Default declaring that the Watsons were in breach of the terms and conditions of the obligation
secured by the Deed of Trust ... was recorded on or about November 5, 2013 .... " (R.53 at i!35).
The Amended Complaint makes a number of vague allegations that suggest several
different causes of action. For example, the Watsons allege:
That pursuant to the original Note and Deed of Trust and the Loan Modification
Agreement, Plaintiffs performed by making the required payments to Defendant
however, Defendant failed to credit Plaintiffs with said payments; failed to
provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the signed Loan Modification Agreement in
breach of said Note, Deed of Trust and Loan Modification, and have acted in
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ways which are unconscionable in violation of the Statute
Commercial
and the Idaho Credit Code.

Frauds,

Uniform

(R.53 at iJ39). The Amended Complaint also alleges that:
Further Plaintiffs have detrimentally relied upon the Loan Modification
Agreement and the promises of Defendants and if Plaintiffs are no [sic]
reimbursed all proceeds paid toward said agreements, they will be damaged and
Defendants will be unjustly enriched as a result of said breach and unconscionable
conduct in an amount to be proven at trial in this matter.
(R.54 at iJ40). In the prayer for relief, the Amended Complaint seeks relief under various statutes
and lists causes of action, but none of these alleged claims have the necessary supporting
allegations.

For example, the Watsons seek "judgment against Defendants for damages and

declaratory relief for violation of the notice requirements ofldaho Code§§ 45-1505 and 45-1506
in an amount as may be proven at trial ands [sic] declaring the non-judicial foreclosure
invalid .... " (R.55 at iJ7).

However, the Watsons make no other allegations concerning any

deficiency of any notice.

The prayer also states a claim for breach of contract against

"Defendants" without specifying which contract was breached by which defendant. Similarly
the Watsons pray for a judgment "against Defendants for violations of the Statute of Frauds, the
Uniform Commercial Code, and the Idaho Credit Code," but fail to specify which specific
defendant violated any specific provision of those statutes. (R.55).
Other than identifying MERS, Green Tree, and Fannie Mae as parties (see R.50 at ,r,r4-6),
there are only a handful of other allegations concerning these entities. The only substantive
allegation concerning MERS is the statement that pursuant to the Deed of Trust, MERS "was
acting solely as nominee for Lender and Lender's successors and assigns and as such was the
beneficiary under the Deed of Trust."

(R.52 at ,r21 ).
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Regarding Green Tree, the Amended

time

Complaint

the

chain

shows that Green Tree Servicing is the holder of the promissory note and the deed of trust."
(R.53 at if32). The Amended Complaint also alleges that "Bank of America, and/or Green Tree
and or Fannie Mae by and through its predecessor(s) in interested (hereinafter "LENDER"), were
all claiming to the be the beneficiary of said Deed of Trust and Note." (R.53 at if33) .. This is
also the only substantive allegation concerning Fannie Mae.
B.

The Motion To Dismiss

On June 1, 2015, Defendants Bank of America, Greenpoint, and ReconTrust filed a
motion to dismiss (the "Motion to Dismiss"). (R.239-40). In the Motion to Dismiss, the moving
defendants argued that any claim for breach of contract was insufficiently pled. (R.250-52). The
Motion to Dismiss also explained that all defendants had complied with Idaho foreclosure law
because "the recorded documents show that Green Tree met the statutory requirements to initiate
foreclosure." (R.252-53). More specifically, the recorded documents in the Kootenai County
Recorder's office demonstrate that all transfers of the Deed of Trust that occurred prior to the
date of the foreclosure sale were recorded. (R.253).
The Motion to Dismiss explained that any claim asserted against Bank of America for
failing to credit the Watsons for payments failed because any payments were made pursuant to
the Watsons' contractual obligation to repay the loan and thus, cannot constitute unjust
enrichment. (R.253-55). Similarly, the Motion to Dismiss argued that any claim for breach of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing failed as a matter of law because the Watsons
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not alleged

specific tem1 of the Note, Deed of Trust, or Loan Modification

that was purportedly breached. (R.255).
Although the Amended Complaint did not make any specific claim concernmg
defendants' standing to initiate foreclosure, the Motion to Dismiss also explained that "the
foreclosing entity does not need to prove ownership of the Note in order to foreclose and there is
a complete record of recorded documents giving Green Tree standing to foreclose." (R.256).
On June 15, 2015, Green Tree filed an answer and asserted an affirmative defense of
failure to state any claim for relief. (R.271 & R.274). MERS and Fannie Mae never filed a
responsive pleading.
On July 1, 2015, the Watsons filed a Reply and Objection to Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss (the "Objection"). (R.295). The Watsons were still represented by counsel when they
filed their Objection. (See R.295). In the Objection, the Watsons claimed:
Defendants' Motion to dismiss essentially is that Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint
is not specific enough about the allegations concerning Defendants [sic] handling
of Plaintiffs loan. That is what the discovery process is for. At this point,
Defendants are the ones with the particular, specific, knowledge as to what they
did in the handling of Plaintiffs [sic] loan.
(R.318). Although not part of record on appeal, the district court granted Henry Madsen of
Madsen Law Office's motion to withdraw as counsel on July 6, 2015. 2 On August 19, 2015,
Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. filed a joinder to the Motion to Dismiss. (R.327).

2

The fact that counsel for the Watsons withdrew after filing the Objection to the Motion to
Dismiss, but before the hearing, should not affect this Court's analysis because "Prose litigants
are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Golay v. Loomis,
118 Idaho 387,392 (1990) (quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5
(1987)).
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the September

2015 hearing,

Honorable

Haynes granted the Motion

to Dismiss because "the Court finds that the complaint and the amended complaint when read in
its totality failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted." (Transcript on Appeal
("Tr._") at Tr. 25:7-11). Although the district court granted the moving defendants' request for
judicial notice (Tr.11 :2-12), in ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the district court stated it
"analyzed this purely on the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs in their complaint and amended
complaint." (Tr.28:9-11). More specifically, the district court stated:
I'm granting the motion to dismiss by saying there were insufficient pleadings on
which these corporate parties needed to defend themselves. They just weren't
sufficiently plead. I could not have granted any relief on the state of the
complaint because it was just insufficiently plead.
We didn't even get to the merits of the facts. And that's why it seems like I just
ignored your factual assertions here today, and in a sense I did, but that's because
were not even getting to the facts of the case, the complaint was insufficient to get
to that stage of the case where we analyze the facts.
(Tr. 30: 16-31 :2).
On September 11, 2015, the district court executed an Order on the Motion to Dismiss
that stated "Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to all Defendants."
(R.333).

ARGUMENT
Ill.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
"This Court reviews de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Idaho Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)." Brooksby v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 153 Idaho 546, 547 (2012).
After viewing all facts and inferences from the record in favor of the non-moving party, this
Court then looks only at the pleadings to determine whether a claim for relief has been stated.
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of Ketchum, 137

V.

issue is not

1

plaintiff will

ultimately prevail, but whether the party is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Id.
(quotations omitted).
Applying these familiar standards, this Court should affirm the district court's decision in
all respects:

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED ALL CLAIMS PURSUANT
TO IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(B){6)

A.

The District Court Properlv Dismissed All Defendants

The district court properly dismissed the Watsons' Amended Complaint against all
defendants to the action because the Watsons simply failed to state any cause of action against
any defendant.
At the time of the hearing, all counsel for defendants believed that the district court
intended to dismiss all claims against all defendants.

MERS, Green Tree, and Fannie Mae

believe this interpretation is fairly supported by the hearing transcript. (See Tr. 25:7-11& 30:1631 :2). However, to the extent the Court believes the transcript is not clear as to this issue, it
should not affect the Court's analysis because the Watsons did not object to the order on the
Motion to Dismiss.

Thus, the Watsons are precluded from challenging the order and have

waived any issue as to whether the order should apply to Green Tree, MERS or Fannie Mae. See

McCabe v. Craven, 145 Idaho 954, 958 (2008) (pro se plaintiff failed to preserve argument that
court lacked jurisdiction to dismiss case sua sponte because plaintiff failed to raise issue in prior
proceedings before the Court of Appeals); see also Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 866
(2009) ("A party's failure to object to action by the trial court precludes a party from challenging
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that action on appeal"); Henderson v. Smith, 128 Idaho 444, 452 (1996) (Idaho Supreme Court
will not consider issues that are raised for the first time on appeal).
Even if the Watsons had preserved the issue for appeal by objecting in district court, they
have not raised the issue in their opening brief, which also results in waiver of the argument.

Weisel v. Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, 152 Idaho 519, 525 (2012) ("Rule 35(a)(4), LA.R.,
provides that an appellant's failure to include in his initial appellate brief a fair statement of an
issue presented for review results in waiver of the issue").
B.

The Amended Complaint Does Not Contain Sufficient AIJegations Against
MERS, Green Tree, or Fannie Mae

The Amended Complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to support any
claim for relief against MERS, Green Tree, or Fannie Mae.
Concerning MERS, the only substantive allegation is the single statement that pursuant to
the Deed of Trust, MERS "was acting solely as nominee for lender and Lender's successors and
assigns and as such was the beneficiary under the Deed of Trust." (R.52 at i]21 ). That allegation
is not enough to support any claim for relief. Indeed, "having MERS the named beneficiary as
nominee for the Lender conforms to the requirements of a deed of trust under Idaho law."

Edwards v. Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 154 Idaho 511,517 (2013). Without
any other allegations concerning MERS, the Amended Complaint fails to state any cause of
action against MERS.
Regarding Green Tree, the Amended Complaint alleges that "At the time of the filing of
this Complaint the recorded chain of title shows that Green Tree Servicing is the holder of the
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note and the

of trust.

at

The Amended Complaint also states that,

at unspecified points in time, "Bank of America, and/or Green Tree and or Fannie Mae by and
through its predecessor(s) in interested (hereinafter "LENDER"), were all claiming to the be the
beneficiary of said Deed of Trust and Note." (R.53 at 133). This is also the only substantive
allegation concerning Fannie Mae.

Similar to the allegations concerning MERS, these

allegations are not sufficient to state any cause of action against Green Tree or Fannie Mae. The
simple allegation that Green Tree "or" Fannie Mae claimed to be "the beneficiary of said Deed
of Trust and Note" cannot support any contractual or tort claim. Nor does it provide any grounds
to contest the nonjudicial foreclosure.
Concerning the allegation that Bank of America breached the Loan Modification
Agreement, the district court properly dismissed this claim because the Watsons' allegations
concerning their payments after the Loan Modification Agreement are intentionally vague. The
Watsons allege they "continued to make their payments as agreed" after signing the Loan
Modification Agreement on July 1, 2010. (R.52 at 1125 & 27). The Watsons also allege that
"Plaintiffs performed by making the required payments to Defendant however, Defendant failed
to credit Plaintiffs with said payments; failed to provide Plaintiffs with a copy of the signed Loan
Modification Agreement in breach of said Note, Deed of Trust and Loan Modification, and have
acted in ways which are unconscionable in violation of the Statute of Frauds, the Uniform
Commercial Code, and the Idaho Credit Code." (R.53-54 at 139) (emphasis added).
The implication of these allegations is that the Watsons made some payments after the
Loan Modification Agreement, but stopped after a dispute with Bank of America concerning
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Watsons' account was

allegation the Watsons need to make (but

in order to contest the foreclosure or state a breach of contract claim is that they made all
required payments on their Loan after the Loan Modification Agreement was executed in 2010
until the Notice of Default was recorded over three years later in 2013. Without that allegation,
the district court properly dismissed the contract claim because there is "no pleading that
essentially outlines that plaintiffs had performed under the loan modification agreement but there
was simply that they had not been credited for payments, but certainly no concise statement of
how they had performed under that contract." (Tr. 26:14-19). Accordingly, the district court
was correct in dismissing the contract claim. 3
The remainder of the Watsons allegations are too vague and conclusory to support any
cause of action. The Watsons make the following allegation:
That it is of information and belief that there is a defect in the assignments in the
chain of title leading up to said Notice of Default which cuased [sic] a disruption
in the chain of title making the Notice of Default and Notice of Sheriff's Sale
invalid and beyond the statute of limitations for foreclosing upon said Note and
Deed of Trust.
(R.53 at ,I37).

The Watsons fail to provide any specifics regarding the alleged "defect" or

"disruption." Further, the alleged "defect" is merely a legal conclusion, not an factual allegation
required to support a cause of action. See, e.g., Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm 'n, 141 Idaho 129,

3

On April 11, 2016, the Watsons filed a "Citing of Additional Authorities." In that document
the Watsons contend that the Supreme Court of Montana's decision in Morrow v. Bank ofAm.,
NA., 2014 MT 117 (Mont. 2014) is relevant to the issue of Bank of America's handling of the
Loan Modification Agreement. However, that appeal reviewed the trial court's award of
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Id. at Pl. Similar to the Watsons' Objection and
their Appellant's Brief, Morrow does not provide any guidance as to how the allegations in the
Amended Complaint state any cause of action.

- 10

136

order to survive a

12(b)( 6) motion to dismiss, it 1s not

a

complaint to make conclusory allegations).
In the prayer for relief, the Watsons seek "judgment against Defendants for damages and
declaratory relief for violation of the notice requirements ofldaho Code §§ 45-15 05 and 45-1506
in an amount as may be proven at trial ands [sic] declaring the non-judicial foreclosure
invalid .... " (R.55). However, the Watsons make no other allegations concerning the deficiency
of any notice. Instead, the Watsons only allege that a notice of default was recorded on or about
November 5, 2013. (See R.53 at ,r35).
Although the Watsons do state that whether the district court erred in dismissing their
claims under 12(b)(6) is an issue in this appeal (Appellant's Brief at p. 8), the Watsons never
provide any coherent explanation of why the district court erred in ruling that the Watsons had
failed to state any cause of action based on the allegations in the Amended Complaint. See IRCP
8(a)(l) (requirement that a complaint contain a "a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief').
The Watsons also complain that the district court incorrectly stated that the Watsons did
not file any objection to the Motion to Dismiss. The Watsons selectively quote the hearing
transcript in support of this argument. (Appellant's Brief at pp. 8-9). However, the full quote
from Judge Haynes demonstrates that the Court had received and reviewed the Objection.
Now, what the court has heard today, and the record should reflect that the
Watsons did not file any memorandum of objection to the motion to dismiss.
They did they did, I guess object to the motion and indicated that properly that
Rule l 2(b )( 6) motion looks only to the pleadings.
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acknowledged that

Objection,

the

Watsons never explained in their objection how the Amended Complaint satisfied the pleadings
standards.

(See also Tr.12:9-25 (counsel for Bank of America, Greenpoint and Recontrust

discusses the Objection at the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss)).
In sum, the district court properly dismissed the Amended Complaint for failure to state a
claim.

V.

THEWA TSO NS' NEW ARGUMENTS HA VE NO MERIT
A.

MERS Is a Proper Beneficiarv Under Idaho Law

The Watsons argue that any assignment from MERS is void. (Appellant's Brief at p. 19).
As an initial matter, this argument was not alleged in the Amended Complaint, nor was this
argument raised in response to the Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, it cannot be considered now
for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Total Success Jnvs., LLC v. Ada County Highway Dist. (In
re Encroachments), 148 Idaho 688,692 (2010) (issue not preserved for appeal when argument is
not raised in response to a motion to dismiss).
Even if the Watsons had preserved this issue for appeal, and even if the Watsons can
challenge the alleged "void ab inito" assignment now, their argument is squarely contradicted by
Idaho law.

Although it is far from clear which specific transfer the Watsons are now

complaining about, it appears they believe that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of
Trust from MERS (as nominee of the lender and its successors and assigns) to Bank of America
was somehow invalid. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 19 (citing the assignment of deed of trust at
R.65)).
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whether MERS can serve as the named beneficiary as nominee

the lender

and assign a deed of trust has been decided by this Court in Edwards v. j\;fortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, 154 Idaho 511 (2013). In Edwards, the plaintiff claimed that MERS could

not be the beneficiary unless it has an interest in the note that is secured by the deed of trust. Id.
at 514. Even though "[t]he deed of trust was not given for the benefit of MERS or to secure an
obligation owing to MERS," this Court held the lender had the authority to designate an agent to
act on its behalf, and the actions of its agents were equivalent to the actions of the lender. Id. at
516-17 ("Designating MERS as the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee of [the
lender] and its successors and assigns was legally no different from designating [the lender] and
its successors and assigns as the beneficiary").

Therefore, "having MERS the named

beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the requirements of a deed of trust under
Idaho law." Id. at 517 (emphasis added).
Under Edwards, MERS is permitted to assign a deed of trust and record that assignment
even though MERS never owned an interest in the underlying Note because:
Designating MERS as the beneficiary in its representative capacity as nominee of
Lehman Brothers and its successors and assigns was legally no different from
designating Lehman Brothers and its successors and assigns as the beneficiary.
"Pursuant to the grant of authority by the principal, the agent is the representative
of the principal and acts for, in the place of, and instead of, the principal." 3 Am.
Jur. 2d Agency§ 1 (2002).
Edwards, 154 Idaho at 517; see also Rencher v. Recontrust Co., NA., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

153989, *8 (D. Idaho November 12, 2015) ("Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the Idaho Supreme
Court has held that MERS has the authority to assign a deed of trust, and record that assignment,
even though it lacked an interest in the underlying note" (citing Edwards)).
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In support of

the Watsons cite to In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R.

(Bankr. D.

Idaho 2009). In re Wilhelm held that assignments of a deed of trust where MERS "purports to
assign to Movant the relevant deed of trust 'together with' the corresponding secured promissory
note" was insufficient evidence in bankruptcy court to establish ownership of the note when the
declarations submitted in connection with motions for relief from an automatic stay failed to
establish that MERS was authorized to transfer the promissory notes. Id. at 397 & 404. This
Court has already ruled that In re Wilhelm is inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial
foreclosure.

Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 847 n.3 (2012) (expressly

stating that In re Wilhelm is "inapplicable in the context of nonjudicial foreclosure").
The Watsons also appear to suggest that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of
Trust from MERS to Bank of America is invalid because that assignment purports to assign the
Note in addition to the Deed of Trust. (See Appellant's Brief at p. 19 (citing the assignment of
deed of trust at R.65)). The Amended Complaint does not contain any allegations concerning
assignments of the Note other than the insufficient, conclusory allegation that some unspecified
"defect" may have occurred.

(R.53 at iJ37).

The Watsons cite to Bank of New York v.

Silverberg, 86 A.D. 3d 274 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) in support of this new argument. That case

held that under New York law, MERS lacked authority to assign an interest in the note as agent
of the lender because "MERS was never the lawful holder or assignee of the notes .... " Id. at
283.
Promissory notes are negotiable instruments governed by contract law and Articles 3 and
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code.

Promissory notes are transferred via endorsement and
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the

not

from

Code§§ 28-3-101 to

605; Idaho Code §§ 28-9-101 to 28-9-628. MERS does not contest that it never held the Note or
that the reference to the Note in the December 3, 2010 transfer of the Deed of Trust was a
scrivener's error. The surplus language does not invalidate the assignment. See In re Lopez, 446
B.R. 12, 19 n.34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) ("Although the Assignment contains language
purporting to assign both the Note and Mortgage, MERS lacked an assignable interest in the
Note. While this surplusage evidences poor drafting, it does not affect the validity of MERS's
assignment of the Mortgage"). In addition, there is no requirement that transfers of a promissory
note be recorded. See Deckys v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86586,
*33 (D. Idaho April 17, 2013) ("the recording statutes do not require instruments to be
recorded .... "). The Watsons are not a party to the assignment of Deed of Trust, and therefore
lack standing to challenge the assignment. See Edwards, 154 Idaho at 516 ("Although standing
is required to invoke the jurisdiction of a court, it is not a requirement for the nonjudicial
foreclosure of a deed of trust. Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to restrain the foreclosure sale based
upon MERS's alleged lack of standing" (citations omitted)); see also Vittitow v. Bank of Am.,

NA., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146441, at *9-10 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 10, 2014) ("It is a wellestablished point of law that borrowers lack standing to challenge the assignment of their Deed,
as they are non-parties to the assignment").
Accordingly, the fact that the December 3, 2010 assignment of the Deed of Trust from
MERS to Bank of America contains surplus language regarding an assignment of the Note does
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not

the assignment

Deed

Trust

it does not support

causes

action suggested in the Amended Complaint.
B.

The Watsons' New Arguments Have No Merit

The Watsons make a number of new arguments that do not provide any basis to overturn
the district court's decision. For example, the Watsons contend that defendants are in violation
of the Truth in Lending Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Appellants' Brief p.
22), but those claims are not alleged in the Amended Complaint. Accordingly, they cannot be
asserted for the first time on appeal.
The W atsons also contend that "Defendants have engaged in a contradictory and
fraudulent list of Statements, Notices and Court Entries, regarding the identity of the true Entity,
to whom the Plaintiffs owed the debt to." (Appellants' Brief at p. 14). According to the
Watsons these acts increased the risk that the Watsons would receive claims that the Watsons
owe two or more different entities for the same debt. (Id.) However, there are no allegations
related to this claim in the Amended Complaint and these new claims do not relate to any of the
causes of action the Watsons attempted to allege in the Amended Complaint.
The Watsons suggest that defendants have failed to prove any right to foreclose because
they have not produced a "blue ink signed original Note .... " (Appellants' Brief at p. 17). The
Watsons made no allegations concerning this theory in the Amended Complaint. Even if the
Watsons had preserved this argument for appeal, it has already been rejected by this Court. In
Trotter v. Bank ofN. Y. Mellon, this Court held that "pursuant to LC. § 45-1505, a trustee may

initiate nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership of
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note or

that

trust beneficiary

or

authorized the trustee to initiate those proceedings." Trotter, 152 Idaho 842,847 (Idaho 2012);
see also Mortensen v. A1ortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140933, *35*36 (D. Idaho Aug. 24, 2012) (holding that under Trotter, there is no requirement that the trustee
produce the original "wet-ink" note and deed of trust to undertake a non-judicial foreclosure).
Finally, the Watsons suggest that the foreclosure cannot proceed until a determination is
made as "to whom the debt is owed," presumably referring to who owns the Watsons' loan.
(See, e.g., Appellants' Brief at p. 22). This Court has already rejected this argument, holding that
"a trustee may initiate non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without proving
ownership of the underlying note .... " Trotter, 152 Idaho 847. Accordingly there is no
requirement for the district court to determine who owns the Watsons' loan. As the Idaho
district court has stated, "the borrower (the maker of the note) 'should be indifferent as to who
owns or has an interest in the note so long as it does not affect the maker's ability to make
payments on the note."' Cherian v. Countywide Home Loans, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
166834, *8 (D. Idaho Nov. 20, 2012) (quoting Veal v. Am. Home Mortgaging Serv., Inc., 450
B.R. 897, 912 (9th Cir. BAP 2011)).

VI.

MERS, FANNIE MAE, AND GREEN TREE JOIN THE ARGUMENTS MADE BY
BANK OF AMERICA, GREENPOINT, AND RECONTRUST
The gravamen of the Amended Complaint are the allegations that the Watsons agreed to a

loan modification with Bank of America. (R.52-53 at iJiJ23-31 ). From these allegations, the
Watsons appear to seek damages for breach of contract, declaratory relief, and breach of the
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covenant of good

dealing.

R.55). These allegations do not appear to

be addressed to MERS, Fannie Mae, or Green Tree. However, to the extent these allegations can
be construed against these defendants, MERS, Fannie Mae and Green Tree expressly join and
incorporate herein the arguments made by Respondents Bank of America, Greenpoint, and
ReconTrust.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the district court's decision below should be affirmed in all
respects.
Respectfully submitted,
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